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ABSTRACT. In the years following the end of the cold
war in 1989, Western feminist scholars and activists
expressed disappointment in the failure of the newly
democratic Eastern and Central European countries to
sustain mainstream women’s rights movements and
achieve a marked increase in women’s participation
within the new political parties and political life in
general. The authors, historians of Hungarian women’s
movements with a broad East-West perspective, offer a
novel explanation for this phenomenon. Following an
outline of the main stages of Hungarian women’s
movements and women’s political participation, they
focus on two instances in twentieth-century Hungarian
history that resulted in a rapid transition from anti-
democratic regimes to liberal, parliamentary systems:
the 1918 bourgeois democratic revolution and the
1990 re-introduction of free parliamentary elections.
Examining these two turning points in recent Hungarian
history, separated by 70 years, as case studies of
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re-evaluation of the notion of separate spheres, offering
a timely if co-incidental comment on the recent debate
in theJournal of Women’s History.2
Two instances in twentieth-century Hungarian
history resulted in a rapid transition from anti-
democratic regimes to liberal, parliamentary
systems. Defying expectations from women
activists and outside observers, both the 1918
bourgeois democratic revolution and the 1989
re-introduction of free parliamentary elections
failed to provide women with any significant
increase in political representation. In the
following, we will examine these two case
studies of women’s activism in Hungary,
separated by 70 years, as well as provide
a chronology of the history of women’s
participation in Hungarian politics for the period
in between. Introducing a critical re-evaluation
of the paradigm of separate spheres, we will
argue that under the particular conditions
preceding both regime changes, gender relations
within the democratic opposition took on a form
incompatible with the dichotomy of separate
spheres. The model we are proposing in its place
combines the findings of Barbara Einhorn
(Einhorn 1993) with a new reading of
Habermas’s “authentic public sphere”
(Habermas 1989). This “alternative public
sphere” was created in opposition to the “public
sphere” of official, mainstream politics and as
the expansion of a private sphere that took on
positive connotations as a site of resistance and
integrity with the result that at critical junctures,
women activists sided with their male
counterparts, forfeiting or delegating the
representation of separate gender interests
to them.
From the turn of the century
to 1918: formation of
“alternative public sphere”
Recent studies on the history of European
bourgeois women’s movements have uncovered
a tightly knit, international web of institutional
and personal networks, along with striking
similarities in the local movements’ goals,
concerns and dynamics (Rupp 1997, Paletschek
and Pietrow-Ennker 2004). The Hungarian
bourgeois women’s movement of the early
20th century provides a strong point in case:
during its short history, it displayed an agenda
closely modeled on the program of its Western
counterparts (Szapor 2004).
During the last decade before the First
World War, Hungarian bourgeois feminists
had solidified their ties with the international
women’s rights movement and focused their
fight for political, educational and legal rights
increasingly on the suffrage. In keeping with the
similarities with Western European women’s
rights movements, Hungarian bourgeois
feminists reaped the reward of their 15-year
long struggle at the end of the First World War.
The new government of the National Council,
born as a result of the revolution of 31st October
1918, and led by Count Michael Ka´rolyi and
a coalition of liberal nationalists, social
democrats, bourgeois radicals and various
groups of intellectuals, represented a
comprehensive program of democratic reforms.
In its first “popular decree” it extended universal
manhood suffrage to men over the age of 21
and women over the age of 24. Ka´rolyi
himself had been a declared supporter of
women’s rights since before the war, and the
Feminists joined the National Council that
provided the mandate for his revolutionary
government until parliamentary elections,
scheduled for March 1919. This was, however,
where the similarities with Western European
women’s movements ended. The scheduled
elections never took place; instead, the
Communist takeover in March 1919 was
followed in short order by counter-revolution
and the stabilization of a right-wing
conservative regime that had gradually
abolished democratic political reforms,
including women’s political and educational
rights and their main representative
















































It is against this bleak outcome that one has to
consider the performance and fate of the
Feminists during the months of the democratic
revolution. In the absence of any detailed study
on the history of the Feminist Association
during the revolutionary months, we can only
venture an indirect assessment that, judging
from the end result, they failed to renew their
strategy and re-energize their membership in
the drastically changed political context.
However, sources pointing to the concrete
circumstances of this failure provide important
clues for a re-evaluation of the separate spheres
in an East-Central European context.
From October 1918 when they joined the
governing National Council, the Feminists
waged a losing battle to keep their Association
above and beyond the quickly emerging
political parties. They argued that their mission
in the new political landscape was to maintain
the role of the independent observer, as
the guardian of women’s rights (Szapor,
forthcoming). By the end of 1918, the failure
of this strategy was clearly confirmed as former
feminist activists had joined political parties
from the extreme left to the extreme nationalist
right. More to the point, a strong cohort of
former feminists who identified themselves as
“Radical Women” defected to the Bourgeois
Radicals, a party of democratic socialists and
left liberals led by Oscar Jaszi. It is the latter
group, self-identified as “Radical Women” that
we are concerned with, as recently emerged
evidence about their agenda points to deeper,
long-term roots of the failure of the Feminists
in the new political context emerging after the
war.
The evidence consists of documents written
by members of the women’s activist group,
running for parliamentary elections under the
banner of the Bourgeois Radicals at the end of
1918. In them, they accuse the Feminists not
only of failing to come up with a new strategy,
adjusted to the changed political environment
but also of failing to represent women’s interests
in the past. There were no specific, abstract
women’s interests, charged the document, to be
represented by a women’s party; middle-class
women were best represented by the parties of
their male counterparts, just as working-class
women’s interests were best represented by the
political party of the working class. It was of
course not an unfamiliar accusation; with its
roots in the accepted Marxist wisdom of the day,
it was frequently evoked during the previous
decade, the most intensive years of the fight for
both universal manhood suffrage and women’s
suffrage, by the Social Democrats, competing
with bourgeois feminists for the support of
women workers (Szapor, forthcoming). Yet it
had a very different sting coming from women’s
activists with close ties to the Feminists. The
signatories of the document, all woman
candidates for the Bourgeois Radical Party
in the upcoming elections, had been, without
exception, long-standing members of the
Association of Feminists who had severed
their ties to the Association only weeks before.
And while their position at this point could
be attributed, to some degree, to the heated
climate of the election campaign, it also
betrayed a deeper-running ambiguity
concerning the perception of women’s special
rights. Ultimately, it highlighted the systemic
difficulties of building and maintaining a
political movement representing women’s
interests at crucial points in Hungarian history.
For an explanation, we have to go back to
the construction of Hungary’s democratic,
extra-parliamentary opposition during the
decade preceding World War I. Organized as
a loose web of institutions and personal
networks, it was a counter-culture that united
existing (Social Democrats) and emerging
(Bourgeois Radicals) political parties, as well
as the formal and informal institutions of the
urban intelligentsia and artistic and literary
avant-garde. The Association of Hungarian
Feminists was a respected and recognized
member of this counter-culture, representing
the special interests of women, with an emphasis
on the rights of middle-class working women.
While the first leaders of the Feminists came
from the ranks of the first white-collar female
union, the bulk of the membership was recruited















































university educated cohort of young women
(Szapor 2004). They had strong personal ties
to this counter-culture, itself largely excluded
from mainstream political and social life.
These two factors combined had the effect
of creating a realignment of the public and
private spheres markedly different from that
described in the Western context.
The progressive counter-culture of early
twentieth-century Budapest emerged outside
of the “public sphere” of official, mainstream
politics and culture and as an extension of the
“private.” This last point, the fluidity between
the “private sphere” and the counter-culture is
well illustrated by the significant role of salons
in the early days of this counter-culture, kept
both by men and women. Much like the salons
of the late 18th century, cited by Habermas as
the scenes of the emerging “authentic public
sphere” during the period preceding the French
Revolution, their latter-day incarnations in early
twentieth-century Budapest played a crucial
role in negotiating a fertile middle ground
between the private and the public (Habermas
1989, 30; Szapor, forthcoming). These informal
institutions, such as debating societies and
open universities, formed the backbone of an
“alternative public sphere” that provided its
members with the framework of full-fledged
political activism at a time when official,
mainstream political life was closed to them
(Szapor, forthcoming).
In addition to training its male members in
the skills needed for public, political and
cultural roles, this alternative public sphere
also provided an environment in which young
women could experiment with new, public
roles. Not only did this alternative public
sphere support their sustained efforts for
higher education and social and political
activism but, at the same time, allowed
them to stay within the established norms of
social respectability. This also explains the
over-representation of young women from
assimilated Jewish families among the
university graduates and feminist activists: they
encountered less resistance—and in many
cases were supported by their families—than
young women from the traditional, Christian
elite (Pet 2002).
While the above application of Habermas’s
model to detect an “authentic public sphere”
that we will call “alternative” challenges the
paradigm of separate spheres widely used in
Western women’s history, it also highlights the
long-term consequences of such an alternative
model to women’s perception of gender
divisions and specific gender interests. It was
Barbara Einhorn who first called attention to
the changing meanings of the private and public
spheres under different social and political
conditions when she argued that under the vastly
different experiences of Eastern European
women (in her case those living in the oppressed
civil society of the German Democratic
Republic in the years preceding 1989), the
dichotomy of private and public spheres gained
widely different meanings from those in
Western Europe (Einhorn 1993, 6). In this case,
the official policy of gender equality discredited
any public commitment to women’s rights
because it was represented by an oppressive
state; on the other hand, the private sphere, the
only haven of civil society, reinforced solidarity
between the genders.
Mutatis mutandis, the alternative public
sphere of Hungary’s turn-of-the-century
counter-culture shaped its young women
members’ perception of gender divisions and
gender interests. Their early, defining
experiences were acquired in the decade
preceding World War I when their cohort was
part of the alliance of progressive political and
artistic movements, in an all-out fight against
the gatekeepers of semi-feudal, conservative
official Hungary. In other words, in their
perception the main frontlines were drawn not
between men on the one side, protecting the
boundaries of the public sphere and reinforcing
the patriarchy of the private sphere, and
women on the other side, but between
representatives of the old and new Hungary.
Despite the ambiguity and setbacks in the
representation of women’s rights by the
progressive political forces, including the















































it was on the strength of this solidarity—whether
perceived or real is beside the point here—that
the “Radical Women” of 1918 opted for
delegating the representation of women’s
rights to their male comrades-in-arms and
demolishing the remnants of their former
sisterhood at the end of 1918, in the hour of their
short-lived triumph.
1919–1945: the “alternative
public sphere” as a
submerged network
The short-lived triumph failed to survive the
first Soviet-type regime that governed Hungary
between 21 March and 1 August 1919. At the
elections for the Councils of workers and
soldiers the government introduced a new,
ideological type of discrimination: although in
principle suffrage was universal and included
women, only those possessing either Socialist
or Communist party or trade union membership
cards were allowed to vote. Following the
collapse of the Republic of Councils due to the
military advancement of the Entente forces, in
1920, the Trianon Peace Treaty imposed a
new electoral law on the Hungarian political
elite, opening up political space for women
and resulting in a new type of challenge of
the dichotomy of public and private spheres
(Kontler 1999, 341). The first female MP in
the Hungarian Parliament, Margit Slachta, used
equality arguments together with a maternal
framework to express the need for conservative
women to extend their power based on the
values of the public sphere. She used tactics of
petition and coalitional mobilization to preserve
the voting rights of women in 1922 when she
argued: “we are as much the citizens of this
country as the men” (Slachta 1935, 28). In
her argument, it was social work that offered
women a frame of opportunity to be opened
up for public activity since the ideology of
separation worked not only for securing support
from the mainstream male politicians, but
also offered a site for constructing female
subjectivity as an agent of political change in
a self-limited frame. This argument undermined
and challenged the misogynist tendencies of
inter-war Hungarian political life in which
“women”, especially the “new women”, were
represented as unpredictable and dangerous
to the male economic, political and cultural
hegemony. The original hopes, nurtured by
women mobilized in the maternal frame that
women’s presence will bring in peace and
purity, were quickly replaced by the stereotype
of “women as dangerous” (Slachta 1935, 17).
Meanwhile the Hungarian bourgeois feminist
movement had been weakened with
emigration—a gain for the international
women’s movement—and became a submerged
network (Taylor 1989), unable to challenge the
class-struggle-centered, gender blind political
practices of the Social Democrats or the
“privatized public sphere” concept of the
conservatives. The increasing anti-Semitism
and general misogynist tendencies of Horthy
Hungary, however, deprived women from any
gains in an “alternative public sphere” such as
prestige (Pet 2001a).
The “pre-suffrage” women’s movement had
been originally characterized by a negligence
towards political aims. These associations,
organized along charity, alumni, artistic,
cultural, and scientific lines were formed with
a small, local membership, and were aimed at
supporting families with individual charity.
The “post-suffrage” women’s associations
were different insofar as their political aims
and their mass membership are concerned.
After 1919, the pre-suffrage associations
continued their activity but the new type of
associations changed the social space for their
activity. The post-suffrage associations built
up a strong relationship with the state and
they acted in some cases as a “transmission
belt” between the policy makers and the
citizens.
In the traditional political structure there
was not much space for women. The political
representations of Hungarian women’s
associations were based on two different claims.















































of Female Clerks (No˜tisztviselõk Országos
Egyesülete), demandedequalitywith their
male colleagues; the other one was the women’s
section of the labor movement and the Social
Democratic Party. The Social Democrats were
strongly representing women’s interests and
had prominent women members. Anna Ke´thly,
the greatly respected woman leader of the Social
Democrats, was both a member of the
Parliamentary Group and the Party Presidium.
She advocated in Parliament to pass the bills
supporting working women as mothers, giving
them economic independence. After the
unexpected victory of the Social Democrats in
the municipal elections in Budapest in 1925
three women were elected as members of the
Budapest City Hall. (One of them, Polla´kné
Szeréna Stern, remained a member until the end
of the period.) Their activity focused mainly on
the fight for suffrage as well as social politics,
such as daycare, free milk supply, and summer
holiday camps. The Hungarian political parties
were all electoral parties, with the exception
of the Social Democratic Party. Consequently
the Social Democratic Party was the only party
with a well-organized membership, well-
elaborated program and a group of trained and
experienced female politicians by 1945. The
trade unions, affiliated with the Party, fought for
emancipation based on the framework of the
equality between sexes.
Besides the social democrats, the much-
weakened Association of Feminists was also
an initiator and fighter for universal women’s
suffrage. The Association was also a prisoner
of its illusions related to their mission. From
their correspondence it is obvious that they
considered themselves as the only true
representatives of women’s interests: “If we
do not work with all our strength who will guard
our principles?”3 The tone of their meetings
was very gloomy: “Very often we feel that we
are further from our goal that we had been
30 years ago.”4 The Feminist Association had
a glorious past, a stagnating present and an
uncertain future.
The first wave of feminism lasted in Hungary
from the early years of the 20th century to 1945
when in the country under Soviet occupation
Hungarian women were given the vote without
any restrictions. This first wave was initiated
by the forces of liberal progression represented
by both liberal and social democrats and its
fruits, the introduction of limited women’s
suffrage, were harvested under the very
conservative, right wing Horthy regime.
1945–1989: private sphere
redefined
1945, the end of WWII and universal suffrage
found the re-emerging Association of Hungarian
Feminists with an ageing membership and in
an isolated position as far as their aims were
concerned. The democratization of the country
was imposed, again, by an international
settlement, and the occupying Red Army
and the Communist-led internal politics
implemented a gender equality policy through
utilizing the concept of “privatized public
sphere” using arguments that women earned
their place with their achievements on the
home front (Pet 2003a). Debates about equality
politics were not covering the content of
women’s participation in politics. Moreover,
it was expected by the leadership of the
Communist Party that newly enfranchised
women should be active in “feminine spheres
of politics” such as education and social politics.
From this point onward the exclusion from
political life was based on political-ideological
arguments till 1989. The Association of
Hungarian Feminists was banned in 1951,
together with a wide range of civic associations,
eliminating the social foundation of bourgeoisie
through a drastic centralization implemented
by the Communists. Women’s organizations
were merged into one mass organization,
whose political role, its ever-changing name
notwithstanding, remained the same until the
collapse of Communism.
The term “statist feminism” is used
describing the nearly 50 years of women’s















































of the Soviet block (Havelkova 2000). The
policy making of the communist countries
“mainstreamed” the so-called women’s interests
in the form of quotas and building up of
supporting social welfare institutions. However,
the lived experience with the lip-service type
of implementation and the manipulative gender
politics of the non-democratic regime raised
serious doubts from the women’s perspective.
One of the serious theoretical problems of
understanding the statist feminist period related
to the uncertainty to this heritage. The general
evaluation is blaming this period for the double
or rather triple burden imposed on women as
a lack of “real” emancipatory potential of
the regime. While either, like Hana Havelkova
coining the term of “statist feminism”
acknowledged not only the half hearted
character of the emancipation policy but also
the importance of this heritage as a possible
basis for further development towards gender
equality.
During the state feminist period, gender
politics operated on three levels and the content
and interchange of these levels determined, to
a large degree, women’s failure to use the
turning point of 1989 as an opportunity to
address such widely recognized concerns as
discrimination in the workplace and the “double
burden” (Nikolchina 2002). The first level was
the official ideology of the public sphere, based
on the constitution of 1949 in which men and
women were declared equal, and followed by
the creation of a social welfare network of
crèches, nurseries and after-school programs,
promoting women’s full employment. The
second level took place on the plane of private
life that remained largely untouched by the
Communist egalitarian ideology. This private
sphere remained not only fundamentally sexist
but also served as a site of resistance against
the Communist state interference of human
life. The “feminine characteristics” of family
centeredness, empathy and sensitivity were
celebrated by leading dissent intellectuals as
anti-politics.
It is important to note at this point that
while the 1956 Hungarian revolution was fought
against Stalinist Communism for national
independence and liberty, it was also fought
in the context of the post-1945 period of “forced
emancipation” or “state feminism”. In this
regard, we can claim that the revolution of 1956
resulted in the revival of maternal thinking
and a conservative backlash in women’s
politics. This applied even to women actively
participating in the revolution, defining them
in a maternal frame as mothers or as mourners
(Juhász 1999).
The third level operated through the
interaction between the public and the private
spheres, where the official ideology of equality
reinforced the gender stereotypes of the private
sphere, arguing for keeping men and women
separate as in the well-known emblematic
sculpture of Vera Muhina (Nikolchina 2002).
The sculpture shows the unity of the working
class, represented by a muscular male and the
agricultural workers, represented by a young
woman wearing a headscarf, emphasiszing
the weak and separate sphere of women who
could only hope for social advancement through
the help of men. While most women worked
in full-time employment in Hungary, they
learned individual adaptation strategies and
network building skills while moving between
these three levels without constructing a
political language which they could have used
for voicing their experiences of discrimination
outside of the actual framework of individual
choice. These strategies only highlighted the
fact that women were unable to break through
the glass ceiling in politics or the economy
and served as an individual choice to avoid
confrontation with the male dominated system.
After 1990: towards a new
definition?
The founding principles and institutions of
Hungary’s post-1990 political and social
reorganization were constructed in the Round
Table discussions and resulted in a historical















































Table discussions were modeled after the Polish
example in 1989 and consisted of three sides:
representatives of the Communist Party’s
successor, the opposition and the so-called
“third side,” representing the various “civil
organizations”, including the mass Communist
Women’s Organization. The third side was
assisting in the major decisions which laid down
the principles and constitutional framework of
the new Hungary. The value of democracy,
according to Robert Dahl, consists of three
elements: competition, participation and civil
liberties (Bozóki 2000, 23). In the Round Table
discussion participation was not mentioned,
because the voluntarist, quasi-democratic
characteristic of the pre-1989 political system
was counterbalanced by the liberal “non-
participatory” democracy.
In 1989 the structure of women’s
organizations in Hungary followed the same
pattern as at the turn of the century or in 1945.
Out of the 65 000 non-profit organizations listed
in the registry of the Central Statistical Office in
1997, 60 were labeled women’s organizations
and two of them accepted the label “feminist”.
At present, the Hungarian feminist movement
is confined to a very narrow social spectrum.
It is made up predominantly of women
intellectuals: sociologists, economists,
journalists, and a few historians in their mid-30s
and 40s based in university centers. Women’s
representation remains largely outside of the
conventional political framework. Influential
pressure groups and some NGOs have been
unable to overcome the gap between the “big
policy makers” and the voters. Since Hungarian
electoral preferences are not settled (25% of the
voters are “undecided”), democratic elections
may boost interest in women’s issues—again
from “above”. Hence, after 1989, when
feminists brought up the lack of a feminist
consciousness in Hungary, they encountered
deep antipathy among other women in the
region. The difference between Hungary and
many Western countries lay in the strength of
the civil society. As far as NGOs are concerned
in the West and the presence of a network
of associations and organizations extending
throughout society that could be used by female
scholars and academics both as a defensive
power-base and as a tool to increase social
awareness in gender issues. In Eastern Europe,
the abolition of women’s associations and the
“Gleichschaltung” of the women’s movements
during the Stalinist period not only eliminated
any chance of institutional pressure but also
resulted in a lack of female politicians capable
of representing women’s interest in other fields.
Women’s political socialization took place in
the Communist women’s mass-organizations,
on the grounds of psychological reflexes that
were formed by male politicians in order to
secure and maintain their political power.
The situation has fundamentally changed
with Hungary entering the enlarged European
Union and falling under the principle of gender
equality in the Maastricht Treaty that requires
its implementation via gender mainstreaming.
As after the enlargement process the external
becomes internal, it also means that the complex
realities of post-socialist gender relations
will be contributing to the already pressing
uncertainties and inconsistencies of EU gender
equality norm and its implementation policies
which will challenge the provisional facilitating
instruments. During the enlargement talks
between the EU delegation and the national
governments, formal technical criteria were
set up as to how to measure and achieve
gender equality in these countries without
explicitly considering political implications,
consequences and costs of these attempts to alter
historical patterns of discrimination. During
these enlargement talks neither the possible
sanction system nor the institutional framework
had been defined. The Amsterdam Treaty
clearly defines two components of theacquis
as anti-discrimination legislation and gender
equality mechanisms. The governments of the
accession countries interpreted the norm of
gender equality in the framework of anti-
discriminatory legislation and defined
the policy site as the employment. The
implementation of gender equality policy
is problematic due to the translation of the















































discrimination” not only linguistically but
also “institutionally”. This paradox, that the
entrepreneurs of “the East” were complaining
about the gender blind practices of their
own governments, while the EU gender
equality mechanisms in the framework of
anti-discriminatory legislation were accepted by
the same national political elite, is even more
striking if we know the conclusions of recent
scholarship on Eastern Europe about the
alarming deterioration in the past ten years in
women’s position in these societies: their
public, social and economic roles were
diminishing in the past decade (Pet 2003b).
The EU gender equality mechanisms are
now bringing into question the consensual
division between the public and private as
a basis of post-1990 Hungarian politics,
constructed as a result of “masculinization”
(Watson 1993).
“Gender mainstreaming” as one of the policy
traditions of EU gender equity mechanism
was introduced in Hungary during the EU
enlargement talks. The mainstreaming is a
“demanding strategy” (Bretherton 2002, 5)
because gender mainstreaming policy offers a
chance to question deeply embedded cultural
values and to review formation of policy issues.
Critics, such as Bretherton, underlined that
gender mainstreaming as a policy failed to
acknowledge differences among women as far
as race, ethnicity and class are concerned
(Bretherton 2001). Also the EU created the
framework to set up institutions to review
national gender equality mechanisms; however,
it did it in a humble way which is consisting
of any sanctions. This framework did go
further than the UN Beijing declaration in
1994 obligations as far as governmental level
institutionalization of women’s politics is
concerned. The institutional framework,
legislation and the personal experience of
political campaigns might create powerful
alliances, not only between different EU
“femocrats”, and also it helps to set up contacts
between Hungarian NGOs and international
organizations in order to redefine political
space.
Conclusion
Both the pre-1919 Hungarian political elite and
the Kadar-regime kept its power through
controlling the criteria of election. The
representation of women’s political interests
in both cases happened through mainstream
political structures controlled by male
politicians who sacrificed without hesitation
these particular interests in the name of
“authentic/alternative public sphere”. Women in
the democratic opposition of the 1970s and
1980s, the “flying universities” and thesamizdat
publications shared the fate of their foremothers
in 1918/19 (Peto 2001b). Moreover, in 1990,
women’s political participation was also
crippled by the heritage of the state feminist
period, a drastically decreased participation of
women in public life, expressed both in the
number of women politicians and the lack of
civil society. At this point, in 2004, there is no
political force with a vested interest in changing
this conveniently subordinate status of women
or taking up the representation of women’s
interests. So it is only a question of time before
we get to know if the concept of alternative
public sphere contributes to transforming
gendered power structures by opening windows
of opportunity to Hungarian women in the
third Millennium.
NOTES
1. This paper was prepared in the framework of
“Reception and Creativity” research project
of the Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian
Academy of Sciences in 2003.
2. Research for this article had been completed
by the time of the publication of the Spring
2003 issue of theJournal of Women’s History,
15 (1), devoted to “Rethinking Public and
Private”.
3. Report of Melanie Vambe´ry, one of the leaders
of the Feminist Association in 1928, MOL
(Hungarian National Archive) P. 999. 2. 55.
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Kontler, László. 1999.Millennium in Central Europe.
Budapest: Atlantisz.
Nikolchina, Miglena. 2002. The Seminar: Mode
d’emploi. Impure Spaces in the Light of Late
Totalitarianism.Differences, 15 (1), 96–127.
Paletschek, Sylvia, Pietrow-Ennker, Bianka (eds).
2004.Women’s Emancipation in the 19th Century;
A European Perspective. Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press.
Pet, Andrea. 1997. Hungarian Women in Politics. In:
Scott, Joan et al. (eds):Transitions, Environments,
Translations: The Meanings of Feminism in
Contemporary Politics. New York: Routledge.
Pet, Andrea. 2001a. “Kontinuitaet und Wandel
in der ungarischen Frauenbewegung der
Zwischenkriegperiode.” In: Gergard, Ute (ed.):
Feminismus und Demokratie. Europeaische
Frauenbewegung der 1920er Jahre. Königstein:
Ulrike Helmer Verlag, 138–59.
Pet, Andrea. 2001b.Rajk Júlia. Budapest: Balassi.
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